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Abstract 
We study experimentally the nature of dominance violations in three minimalist dominance-
solvable guessing games. Only about a third of our subjects report reasoning consistent with 
dominance; they all make dominant choices and almost all expect others to do so. Nearly two-
thirds of subjects report reasoning inconsistent with dominance, yet a quarter of them actually 
make dominant choices and half of those expect others to do so. Reasoning errors are more 
likely for subjects with lower working memory, intrinsic motivation and premeditation attitude. 
Dominance-incompatible reasoning arises mainly from subjects misrepresenting the strategic 
nature (payoff structure) of the guessing games. 
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Abstract 
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dominance; they all make dominant choices and almost all expect others to do so. Nearly two-
thirds of subjects report reasoning inconsistent with dominance, yet a quarter of them actually 
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1. Introduction 
Experimental studies extensively document deviations of initial responses from equilibrium 
predictions in iterated-dominance-solvable games, including matrix and other normal-form 
games, extensive-form bargaining games and guessing games (see Costa-Gomes et al., 2001, 
and Costa-Gomes and Crawford, 2006, for overviews). Non-equilibrium behavior is typically 
attributed to subjects’ non-equilibrium beliefs about others’ irrationality rather than their own 
irrationality. Especially Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006, hereafter CGC), through joint 
analysis of initial responses and information search patterns in iterated-dominance-solvable 
guessing games, convincingly show that many subjects’ deviations from equilibrium “can be 
confidently attributed to non-equilibrium beliefs rather than irrationality, risk aversion, altruism, 
spite, or confusion.” (p. 1740) CGC conclude that the findings “affirm subjects’ rationality and 
ability to comprehend complex games and reason about others’ responses to them...” (p. 1767). 
However, evidence on individual rationality from simpler, dominance-solvable games seems 
much less conclusive. In Grosskopf and Nagel’s (2008) two-player dominance-solvable 
guessing game, 90% of subjects violate simple dominance. Moreover, Devetag and Warglien 
(2008) show that nearly a quarter of their subjects cannot even correctly represent the relational 
structure of preferences in a two-player game similar to dominance-solvable guessing games. On 
the other hand, in Bone et al.’s (2009) extensive-form game against nature, only 5% of subjects 
violate simple dominance, which suggests that most people are in principle capable of applying 
dominance when it is transparent.1
Similar to Charness and Levin (2009), who simplify common value auctions to study the origin 
of the winner’s curse, we examine the nature of dominance violations in three “minimalist” 
dominance-solvable guessing games featuring two or three players choosing among two or three 
strategies. Also called beauty contest games, guessing games are ex ante well-suited for studying 
individual rationality bounds without the potentially confounding effects of other-regarding and 
risk preferences. Guessing games of the dominance-solvable nature have the additional appeal of 
making a player’s optimal choice independent of her beliefs about others’ choices (and hence 
others’ rationality). 
                                                 
1 We refer to the second decision node of Bone et al.’s game where almost all of 152 subjects choose a 
four-payoff distribution that first-order stochastically dominates another such distribution, which is far 
above random choice (50%). However, the whole game is a two-stage game, and only about a third of the 
subjects detect dominance at the first (prior) decision node (using, for example, backward induction or 
the strategy method). 
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To better understand the decision-making errors our subjects commit, we ask them to report 
(alongside making choices) their detailed reasoning underlying the choices, and also to state 
their beliefs about their anonymous partners’ choices (i.e., about others’ rationality). We then 
study how the reported reasoning – classified according to dominance-compatibility by two 
independent examiners – translates into the subjects’ stated choices and beliefs. Following the 
lead from psychology (e.g., Simon, 1978 and 1989; Stanovich and West, 2000) and recently 
experimental economics (e.g., Ballinger et al., 2008; Rydval, 2007), we also examine how 
subjects’ reasoning classes and choices relate to their measured cognitive abilities and 
personality traits (see Sections 4 and 6.2). 
Only about a third of our subjects reason in line with dominance; they all make dominant 
choices and almost all expect others to do so. By contrast, nearly two-thirds of subjects report 
reasoning processes incompatible with dominance, yet a quarter of them actually make dominant 
choices and half of those expect others to do so. Reasoning errors are more likely for subjects 
with lower ability to maintain and allocate attention (measured by a working memory test), and 
for subjects with lower intrinsic motivation to engage in cognitively demanding tasks (measured 
by the need-for-cognition personality scale) and lower propensity to deliberate while carrying 
out tasks (measured by the premeditation personality scale). In section 6.3, we further explore 
origins of dominance violations and find that dominance-incompatible reasoning arises mainly 
from subjects misrepresenting (to themselves) the strategic nature (payoff structure) of the 
guessing games. 
2. The guessing games 
We study behavior in three symmetric dominance-solvable guessing games depicted in normal-
form representation in Figure 1. A pair or a triplet of players simultaneously choose (or guess) 
among two (0, 1) or three (0, 1, 2) numbers. A fixed monetary prize, M, is won by the player 
whose choice is closest to one-half of the pair’s or triplet’s average choice; multiple winners 
divide the prize equally. Under complete information – an assumption justified by publicly 
announcing the games’ structure – our games have a unique equilibrium in which all players 
choose 0. Games 2p2n and 3p2n are strict-dominance-solvable, i.e., choosing 0 yields a strictly 
higher payoff compared to choosing 1, for any choice(s) of the other player(s). Game 2p3n is 
weak-dominance-solvable, i.e., choosing 0 yields a higher or equal payoff compared to choosing 
1 or 2, for any choice of the other player. 
 
3
Page 5 of 33
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 [Figure 1 about here] 
Previous studies predominantly focus on iterated-dominance-solvable guessing games, with two 
or more players facing various (a)symmetric (across players) strategy spaces larger than ours, 
and with the “winning guess” determined by various sample statistics of players’ guesses (e.g., 
mean, median or maximum) multiplied by various (a)symmetric (across players) target numbers 
smaller or greater than one. These features jointly determine how one’s own guess influences the 
winning guess, and the number of rounds of iterated elimination of dominated guesses necessary 
to identify one’s iteratively undominated guess(es).2 Iterated-dominance-solvable guessing 
games require a simultaneous assessment of players’ individual rationality and their beliefs 
about others’ rationality. In dominance-solvable guessing games, by contrast, equilibrium 
predictions and players’ best responses rely only on individual rationality in the game-theoretic 
sense of obeying simple dominance. This allows us to focus on the basic limits of cognition as 
revealed by dominance violations. 
Behavior in a two-player weak-dominance-solvable guessing game is studied in Grosskopf and 
Nagel (2008 and 2007, hereafter GNa and GNb, respectively, or GN).3 A fixed monetary prize 
is won by the player(s) whose guess is closest to two-thirds of the pair’s average guess. Guesses 
can range from 0 to 100 (inclusive), so the strategy space is much larger than in our games. 
Although guessing 0 is a weakly dominant strategy, 90% of subjects (132 undergraduates with 
no formal training in game theory) initially make dominated guesses above 0, which is close to 
random guesses (99%). The strikingly frequent dominance violations appear robust to increasing 
stakes or implementing more detailed explanation of the guessing game,4 and they only partly 
vanish with more expertise or on-task experience.5
GN further offer a comparison of behavior in the two-player weak-dominance-solvable game 
with behavior in an otherwise identical eighteen-player iterated-dominance-solvable game, 
played by another 36 subjects from the same population. In the eighteen-player game, only 
                                                 
2 See CGC and Grosskopf and Nagel (2008) for an overview of iterated-dominance-solvable guessing 
games. Two-player guessing games are normally dominance-solvable but CGC introduce a new class that 
are iterated-dominance-solvable. 
3 We occasionally use GN to refer to both GNa and GNb which use the same experimental dataset, with 
GNa analyzing first-round behavior and GNb behavior over time. 
4 This result is based on correspondence with Brit Grosskopf. 
5 Experts (economic researchers at conferences) do better than students but their dominance compliance 
is still only 37%. GNb further observe that dominance violations persist even after ten rounds of playing 
the game in fixed pairs: depending on the extent of feedback provided during the game, one- to three-
quarters of student subjects guess above 0 in the tenth round. 
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about 10% of subjects initially violate dominance, far below random guesses (33%) and typical 
for iterated-dominance-solvable games including guessing games.6 Surprisingly, initial guesses 
in the two- and eighteen-player games are similar and even marginally higher in the former 
game with the unique undominated guess of 0. GNb also observe what appears as a lack of 
knowledge transfer between the two games: In a treatment where subjects switch after four 
rounds from the eighteen-player to the two-player game, most of them make a higher guess in 
the fifth round compared to the fourth round.7
In the spirit of Charness and Levin’s (2009) exploration of the origins of the winner’s curse, we 
implement minimalist dominance-solvable guessing games to look closer at the potential sources 
of dominance violations. Compared to GN, our two-player games 2p2n and 2p3n constrain the 
strategy space to only two and three numbers, respectively. In principle, especially game 2p2n 
permits mentally or visually listing all contingencies – i.e., all combinations of both players’ 
possible choices and their payoff consequences – so one can “gradually recognize” the 
dominance of choosing 0 even without being a priori aware of the notion of dominance. As 
illustrated in Figure 1, listing contingencies may be (cognitively) hardest in our three-player 
game 3p2n. In a game-theoretic sense, however, game 3p2n is not harder than game 2p3n since 
the former is strict-dominance-solvable while the latter is weak-dominance-solvable. 
Although our guessing games are simple, they are neither trivial nor necessarily easier to 
represent mentally than guessing games with larger strategy spaces. The latter games may 
facilitate (or necessitate) subjects translating them into stories that are easier to represent 
mentally, although the high rate of dominance violation in GN’s two-player game suggests 
otherwise. Given GN’s findings, we do not expect everyone to solve our games, especially not 
the arguably more complex games 2p3n and 3p2n. The variation in cognitive and game-theoretic 
complexity among our games is meant to aid our understanding of the sources of dominance 
violation. Particularly, the three games may differ in subjects’ reasoning processes and 
reasoning errors. 
                                                 
6 About 90% of subjects guess below ⅔*100, thus seemingly respecting at least one round of iterated 
dominance. This is typical for initial responses in iterated-dominance-solvable games (see, e.g., CGC’s 
Table 6). 
7 These (and other) comparisons should of course be viewed in light of the different sets of dominated 
and undominated strategies across the games. Moreover, since subjects played GN’s two-player game 
repeatedly in fixed pairings and knew about it a priori, they might have viewed their first-round guesses 
as influential for subsequent game play; hence the first-round guesses might not represent true initial 
responses free of repeated-game effects and experimentation. Also, most of GN’s subjects obtained some 
degree of outcome and payoff feedback which is uncommon in studies of initial responses, though GN 
document that the distributions of first-round guesses do not differ across their feedback treatments. 
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Since our focus is on cognition rather than learning, we collect only initial choices in a between-
subjects design. Each of our subjects makes a single choice for one of the games depicted in 
Figure 1, which suppresses any form of learning (including introspective one), repeated-game 
effects, and experimentation.8 Nevertheless, the single choice results from a relatively lengthy 
deliberation process undertaken by subjects when reporting their reasoning. While having only 
one choice per subject could still undermine the reliability of across-game comparisons of 
choice behavior, our primary focus is rather on the relationship between subjects’ reasoning 
processes, choices, beliefs, and cognitive and personality characteristics, as detailed below.  
3. Reasoning classes, decision-making errors and stated beliefs 
In an answer protocol appended to the experiment’s instructions, we prompted subjects to report 
their complete reasoning leading them to their choice, and then to state their choice and beliefs 
about the choice(s) of the other player(s) in their pair or triplet (see Appendix 1).9 Subjects were 
told to report their reasoning in as much detail as possible in order to get paid. 
Two examiners from outside the research team – CERGE-EI third-year Ph.D. students with 
advanced training in game theory – independently classified subjects’ reasoning processes based 
on inspecting copies of the answer protocols, without observing the stated choices and beliefs 
which we deleted from the protocols. This was to ensure that the examiners focus on classifying 
subjects’ reasoning processes rather than inferring the classification from the stated choices and 
beliefs, with the ultimate aim of detecting any differences between reasoning processes and 
choices.10
We gave the examiners classification instructions (see Appendix 2 for details) asking them to 
assign each subject’s reasoning process into one of the following three reasoning classes: 
                                                 
8 In our opinion, our games are too similar to each other to warrant their implementation in a within-
subjects design, especially given our parallel elicitation of reasoning processes, choices and beliefs. Even 
with new partners for each game and no feedback, or even with the games embedded within a set of other 
games, we would risk considerable introspective learning, making it difficult to disentangle learning from 
cognition. See CGC for a detailed argument for studying truly initial responses. 
9 Subjects in game 3p2n were reminded that they could state different beliefs about the choices of the 
other two players in their triplet, but none of them actually did so. 
10 The examiners were of course not completely blind with respect to choices and beliefs since subjects 
often indirectly stated them as part of their reasoning. However, as will become clear below, such 
indirect statements could still be part of various (correct or incorrect) reasoning processes and had to be 
carefully interpreted by the examiners in the context of a particular reported reasoning process. 
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Reasoning class A 
Wrong reasoning – e.g., due to misrepresenting the strategic nature of the guessing game or 
making a numerical mistake, or irrelevant belief-based reasoning. 
Reasoning class B 
Reasoning based on listing contingencies involving own dominant choice of 0, but without 
explicitly explaining why 0 is the dominant choice. 
Reasoning class C 
Reasoning explicitly recognizing and explaining why 0 is the dominant choice, with or without 
listing contingencies. 
Class A includes a variety of wrong reasoning processes discussed in detail in Section 6.3. Class 
A, for example, includes irrelevant belief-based reasoning such as “I believe the other player 
chooses 1, so I will choose 1 and we will split the prize.”11 By contrast, belief-based 
explanations of dominance are included in reasoning class C – e.g., “I believe the other player 
chooses 0 because that’s the best for her, so I will choose 0 not to lose the game,” or “I expect 
the other player to choose between 0 and 1 randomly or with some probabilities, but no matter 
what she chooses, my best choice is 0.” 
For class B, listing contingencies means listing the combinations of the pair’s or triplet’s 
possible choices and their consequences, in any plausible mathematical, verbal or graphical 
form. However, since it would have been impossible for the examiners to distinguish between 
intentional and unintentional omission of (irrelevant) contingencies involving own dominated 
choices, class B requires listing only the contingencies involving own dominant choice of 0: 
Game 2p2n: contingencies involving choice pairs (0, 0) and (0, 1) 
Game 2p3n: contingencies involving choice pairs (0, 0), (0, 1) and (0, 2) 
Game 3p2n: contingencies involving choice triplets (0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1) and (0, 1, 1) 
Class B therefore includes subjects who used the correct (if not most efficient) approach which 
in principle allowed them to recognize the dominance of choosing 0, but who apparently did not 
                                                 
11 We argue in Section 6.3 that irrelevant belief-based reasoning might in fact stem from misrepresenting 
the strategic nature of the guessing games. There is no indication that irrelevant belief-based reasoning 
could be induced by our belief elicitation procedure or result from fairness considerations. 
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recognize it. By contrast, class C includes subjects who explicitly recognized and explained the 
dominance of choosing 0. In addition to the aforementioned belief-based explanations of 
dominance, class C subjects used reasoning such as “Choosing 0 is an always-winning choice,” 
or “If I choose 1, I can lose, whereas if I choose 0, I always win or at worst tie,” or “If I choose 
0, I don’t need to take the choice(s) of the other player(s) into account.” 
To the extent that subjects did not always report their reasoning clearly and completely, we 
cannot rule out classification errors. If uncertain whether a subject falls into class A (class C), 
the examiners assigned the subject into a “borderline” class A/B (class B/C). If uncertain 
whether a subject used erroneous belief-based reasoning or rather a belief-based explanation of 
dominance, the examiners assigned the subject into a “borderline” class A/C. Appendix 2 
outlines further steps taken to minimize classification errors. 
We repeatedly reminded the examiners that our primary classification goal was to maximize the 
accuracy of assignment into reasoning classes A and C. This assignment turns out to be robust in 
that, except for four and three subjects, respectively, the examiners’ independent assignments 
into class A and class C coincide. The robustness is much lower for class B and the borderline 
classes where the assignments mostly arise from an initial disagreement between the examiners 
and subsequent re-classification.12 In the discussion of results below, we therefore mainly 
concentrate on the robust classes A and C. 
Our classification procedure improves upon previously implemented classifications of reasoning 
processes in iterated-dominance-solvable guessing games (e.g., Bosch-Domenech et al., 2002; 
CGC) which relied on correctly disentangling individual (ir)rationality from beliefs about 
others’ (ir)rationality.13 Our classification, by contrast, focuses solely on whether subjects are 
rational in terms of obeying simple dominance. Reasoning processes in a dominance-solvable 
guessing game were also collected by GN but were used only to illustrate specific cases of 
dominance violation. Our advantage over GN lies in our games having constrained strategy 
spaces. As a result, our subjects mostly report their reasoning in an easily interpretable manner, 
which reduces the potential scope for classification errors. 
                                                 
12 See Appendix 2 for details of the re-classification procedure. 
13 Bosch-Domenech et al. classify mostly optionally reported reasoning processes from lab, classroom, 
and field experiments. As an implementation caveat, the classification is done by the authors themselves. 
The authors use the classification to conclude that guess distributions visually differ across reasoning 
classes broadly as predicted by iterated belief types. CGC collect reasoning processes only ex-post 
through a debriefing questionnaire, and use them to diagnose reasoning errors (of the kind we discuss in 
Section 6.3) or exotic decision rules not discernible from subjects’ guesses alone. 
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This has important implications for interpreting the relationship between reasoning classes and 
choices (Section 6.1). In particular, provided that classification errors are minimal, class C 
subjects should make the dominant choice of 0, unless they slip up during the ultimate decision-
making stage of actually stating their (dominant) choice. By inspecting the choice distribution of 
class C subjects, we can assess the extent of such choice errors. On the other hand, class A 
subjects most likely make errors during an earlier reasoning stage of the decision-making 
process, and we explore the nature of such reasoning errors (Section 6.3) and trace them back to 
subjects’ cognitive and personality characteristics (Section 6.2). We also check the extent to 
which class A subjects make dominated or (accidentally) dominant choices. 
Beliefs about others’ choices play no strategic role in our dominance-solvable guessing games as 
they are irrelevant for own optimal behavior. For that reason, we do not elicit beliefs in an 
incentive-compatible manner, and our aim is not to assess whether subjects act on their beliefs 
(see, e.g., Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker, 2008). We merely interpret subjects’ stated beliefs as 
an interesting indicator of their view of others’ rationality, and we report the beliefs conditional 
on subjects’ own dominance compliance as revealed by their reasoning class and choice (Section 
6.1). This usefully complements the evidence from iterated-dominance-solvable games where 
individual rationality and beliefs are necessarily assessed concurrently.14
4. Cognitive, personality and demographic characteristics 
Our subjects completed several tests of cognitive abilities, several scales measuring personality 
traits, and a demographic questionnaire. Because of no strong priors regarding which individual 
characteristics might predict behavior in our games, measuring a broader set of potentially 
relevant characteristics seemed desirable in order to explore and compare their effect.15 Below 
we briefly outline the measured cognitive, personality and demographic characteristics, of which 
working memory (cognitive ability), intrinsic motivation and premeditation attitude (personality 
traits) turn out to be important predictors of subjects’ behavior. We refer the reader to Rydval 
(2007) and Ballinger et al. (2008) for further details of the cognitive tests and personality scales. 
                                                 
14 We acknowledge that the assessment of beliefs is more informative for class C subjects who apparently 
understood that others’ choices are irrelevant for their own best response, but perhaps less informative for 
class A subjects who rarely understood the strategic nature of the guessing games (see Section 6.3). 
15 Some of the cognitive tests and personality scales were primarily implemented for the purpose of an 
unrelated follow-up experiment completed by the subjects (see Section 5 for details). 
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Working memory is viewed by psychologists as the ability to keep relevant information 
accessible in memory when facing information interference and to allocate attention among 
competing uses when executing cognitively complex tasks. Working memory tests proxy 
general cognitive abilities in that they robustly predict general “fluid intelligence” and 
performance in a broad range of cognitive tasks requiring controlled (as opposed to automated) 
information processing (e.g., Feldman-Barrett et al., 2004; Kane et al., 2004). Working memory 
also positively affects economic performance, such as precautionary saving behavior (Ballinger 
et al., 2008) or forecasting performance (Rydval, 2007). We measure working memory by a 
computerized version of the “operation span” test (Turner and Engle, 1989) that requires 
memorizing sequences (of various lengths) of briefly presented letters interrupted by solving 
simple arithmetic problems. At the end of each sequence, subjects are asked to recall as many 
letters as possible in the correct position in the sequence, which in turn determines the test score. 
Short-term memory reflects information storage capacity as well as information coding and 
rehearsal skills that make the stored information more memorable (e.g., Engle et al., 1999). We 
measure short-term memory by a computerized auditory “digit span” test similar to the Wechsler 
digit span test (e.g., Devetag and Warglien, 2008). Our test requires memorizing pseudo-random 
sequences (of various lengths) of briefly presented digits and recalling them immediately after 
hearing each sequence.16 The test score is based on the number of digits recalled in the correct 
position in the sequences. 
We measure subjects’ personality traits using several item-response personality scales described 
below. Personality traits could predict guessing game behavior but could also correlate with 
measured cognitive abilities, so we measure both to disentangle their effect. Each personality 
scale consists of a collection of statements (worded positively or negatively) for which subjects 
indicate their agreement or disagreement on a scale from 1 to 4. The personality scales were 
included in a single item-response survey in a randomized order identical across subjects. 
The need for cognition scale measures intrinsic motivation to engage in cognitively demanding 
tasks (e.g., Cacioppo et al., 1996). There is an extensive (inconclusive) literature in economics 
and psychology on the channels through which intrinsic motivation could interact with financial 
incentives in stimulating mental or physical effort and performance (e.g., Deci et al., 1999; 
Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000; McDaniel and Rutström, 2001; Ariely et al., 2009). Not 
                                                 
16 What distinguishes the short-term and working memory tests (and cognitive constructs) is an “attention 
interference” task in the latter tests, such as the simple arithmetic problems in the operation span test. 
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addressing the complex interactions, we measure intrinsic motivation to account for the 
possibility that subjects are ex ante differentially motivated to solve the guessing games or that 
intrinsic motivation correlates with subjects’ measured cognitive abilities. 
The premeditation scale captures the propensity to pause and think carefully while carrying out 
(cognitive) tasks, which might be relevant for forming sound reasoning processes in our games. 
The sensation-seeking scale is a general proxy for risk-taking attitude which might affect 
subjects’ willingness to experiment with alternative approaches to solving the guessing games. 
The perseverance scale measure subjects’ determination and perseverance in solving lengthy and 
demanding tasks.17 The math anxiety scale is a proxy for feelings of tension when manipulating 
numbers and solving math problems (e.g., Pajares and Urdan, 1996). 
We further elicit risk preferences using a hypothetical “multiple price list” procedure (e.g., Holt 
and Laury, 2002). While risk preferences theoretically should not affect subjects’ ability to 
reason in line with dominance, subjects who do not recognize the dominance of choosing 0 
might view their own choice as risky, and risk-taking attitude might also matter for the reasons 
hypothesized above for sensation-seeking. Finally, we administer a demographic questionnaire 
to collect data on subjects’ age, gender, field of study, and socioeconomic status such as (family 
and personal) car ownership. 
5. Implementation details 
The experiment was conducted at the Bank Austria Portable Experimental Laboratory at 
CERGE-EI in November 2005 and January 2006, as displayed in Table 1.18 The subjects were 
112 full-time students (Czech natives, with a couple of exceptions permitted based on 
proficiency in Czech) from Prague universities and colleges, namely the University of 
Economics, Czech Technical University, Charles University, and Anglo-American College, with 
                                                 
17 The premeditation, sensation-seeking and perseverance scales capture various aspects of impulsive 
behavior (Whiteside and Lynam, 2001). See Ballinger et al. (2008) for further details. 
18 Due to concerns that subjects in successive experimental sessions might share information relevant for 
performance in the guessing games and some of the cognitive tests, we ensured to the extent possible that 
successive sessions overlapped or that subjects in non-overlapping sessions were recruited from different 
universities or university campuses. Judging from the experiment following the guessing game, subjects’ 
behavior suggests little or no degree of social learning (see Rydval, 2007). 
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the majority of subjects from the first two universities.19 None of the subjects had prior formal 
training in game theory. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Each experimental session started with conducting the cognitive tests and personality scales, 
followed by the guessing game and the demographic questionnaire.20 The guessing game itself 
lasted about 20-30 minutes. We read the instructions aloud (see Appendix 1) and then gave 
subjects virtually unlimited time to re-read the instructions, to ask any questions, and to fill out 
the answer protocol. We did not explicitly check subjects’ understanding of the instructions. 
While experimentalists often implement prior understanding tests or unpaid practice rounds to 
ensure that subjects understand the potential consequences of their and others’ decisions, doing 
so in our simple guessing games would almost inevitably induce undesirable experimenter 
demand effects or suggest strategies to the subjects.21 As an alternative to an understanding test, 
GN implement more elaborate instructions in several sessions of their dominance-solvable 
guessing game, but find no impact on behavior.22 In Section 6.3, we report on additional 
sessions aimed at gauging the nature and extent of our subjects’ misunderstanding. 
The experiment lasted 1.5-2 hours and subjects earned 150 CZK (≅ PPP$12) for its completion. 
In addition, the guessing games featured the fixed prize of M=1500CZK (≅ PPP$117) for the 
winner(s) originating from one pair or triplet selected at random in each session.23 All parts of 
the experiment were anonymous (subjects were assigned a unique ID that they kept throughout 
                                                 
19 Czech Technical University is a relatively non-selective university mostly offering education in various 
branches of engineering, while the University of Economics is a more selective university mostly 
offering education in economics, management and accounting. We do not detect any differences in 
subjects’ behavior related to their field of study, though the sample sizes involved in those comparisons 
are too small to draw any firm conclusions. 
20 After a short break the sessions continued with an individual decision-making experiment unrelated to 
the guessing game (a time-series forecasting task; see Rydval, 2007). 
21 Understanding tests of course strive hard to avoid such adverse effects – usually by checking solely 
that subjects understand how their and others’ decisions determine payoffs – but even that may have 
behavioral consequences. For example, in Bosch-Domenech et al.’s (2002) iterated-dominance-solvable 
guessing game, subjects who a priori observed an example outlining the consequence of guessing a low 
number violated dominance less frequently than other subjects not observing that example. 
22 GN explain how the average of the pair’s guesses is computed and then multiplied by the target 
number to determine the winning guess. This explanation has no effect on the distribution of guesses, 
though one should note that the change in instructions coincided with an increase in stakes as well as a 
minor change in the subject population. 
23 The guessing games were announced as a bonus task. Subjects knew about the existence of a bonus 
task (and the potential prize) from initial instructions. Subjects also knew they could earn an additional 
900CZK (≅ PPP$70) in the experiment following the guessing games. 
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the session) and earnings were paid out privately in cash after the experiment. The order of 
cognitive tests and personality scales was the same across sessions, with the former generally 
preceding the latter. The working memory and short-term memory tests were computerized 
using E-prime (Schneider et al., 2002) while the remainder of the experiment was administered 
in a paper-and-pencil format. 
6. Results 
6.1 Relationship between reasoning classes, choices and beliefs 
Table 2 displays the number of subjects in the reasoning classes defined earlier, aggregated 
across the three guessing games. The first row shows that 66 subjects (59%) used wrong 
reasoning processes (class A), whereas 30 subjects (27%) reasoned consistently with dominance 
(class C). The remaining 16 subjects are scattered among class B and the borderline classes. 
Thus while class B contains only 3 subjects, it can in principle contain up to 13 subjects 
depending on how one interprets the borderline classes A/B and B/C. Similarly, class A can 
contain up to 72 (64%) subjects if adding the borderline classes A/B and A/C, and class C can 
contain up to 40 (36%) subjects if adding the borderline classes A/C and B/C. 
[Table 2 about here] 
The second and third rows of Table 2 display the frequencies of dominant and dominated 
choices. The first column shows that 62 subjects (55%) made the dominant choice of 0 while the 
remaining 50 subjects (45%) violated dominance.24 This can be compared to a rate of 
dominance violation of 56% for random guesses, 10% typically reported for iterated-dominance-
solvable games, and 90% for GN’s weak-dominance-solvable game (see Section 2). In GN’s 
unpublished treatment closest to ours – because of collecting guesses, beliefs and reasoning 
processes – 78% of subjects violated dominance.25
The second and third rows of Table 2 further show that subjects in class A/C or higher all made 
the dominant choice of 0: Hence they apparently did not commit any errors at the ultimate 
                                                 
24 For ease of exposition, the Choice=1 category includes the two subjects who in fact chose 2 in game 
2p3n. Similarly, the Belief=1 category includes the subject who stated a belief of 2. The prevalence of the 
dominated choice of 1 over the dominated choice of 2 might signal a focal-number effect of unity. 
25 We are grateful to Brit Grosskopf for providing us with the data for this unpublished treatment 
conducted with 18 student subjects. Dominance violation rates do not differ between this treatment and 
other treatments without belief elicitation. We again note design differences between our and GN’s 
games, such as the multi-round nature of their experiment and their payoff function rewarding the 
winner(s) in each fixed pair in every round. 
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decision-making stage of stating their dominant choice. On the other hand, the high frequency of 
class A and class A/B subjects suggests a prevalence of reasoning errors made at an earlier stage 
of the decision-making process. Note, however, that little over a quarter of class A and class A/B 
subjects made the dominant choice. Thus to the extent that our classification is correct, the 
observed frequency of dominated choices in fact understates the actual frequency of dominance 
violations as revealed by dominance-incompatible reasoning. 
The remaining rows of Table 2 display subjects’ beliefs, first conditional on reasoning classes 
and then also conditional on choices. The last column indicates that all but three class C subjects 
believed that the other player(s) would likewise make the dominant choice. The second column 
shows that out of the 49 class A subjects who made dominated choices, all but three believed 
that the other player(s) would likewise do so. On the other hand, out of the 17 class A subjects 
who made the dominant choice, little over half believed that the other player(s) would likewise 
do so. This further illustrates that seemingly dominance-compatible choices and beliefs can 
sometimes be based on dominance-incompatible reasoning processes. 
Table 3 disaggregates the percentages of reasoning classes and choices for each game. While our 
primary interest is not in across-game comparisons, we note that the percentage of class C 
subjects is highest in game 3p2n – even higher than in the simplest game 2p2n – and lowest in 
game 2p3n, and vice versa for the percentages of class A subjects. Accordingly, the frequency of 
dominant choices is highest in game 3p2n and lowest in game 2p3n (which is weak-dominance-
solvable and in that respect closest to the GN’s unpublished treatment mentioned above) but is 
always higher than random dominance compliance.26 Thus we might have somewhat “less 
smart” subjects playing game 2p3n – an issue addressed in the next section – or game 2p3n 
might be generally harder to solve, perhaps due to its weak-dominance-solvable nature or its 
larger set of dominated strategies (and hence its lower random dominance compliance). 
[Table 3 about here] 
6.2 Cognitive and personality predictors of reasoning classes and choices 
Here we assume in a very simple manner that reasoning errors and choice errors have a logistic 
structure. In particular, Table 4 reports logit estimates of the effect of statistically relevant 
cognitive and personality characteristics on reasoning classes and choices. Other cognitive, 
                                                 
26 Nevertheless, the three games are very similar in terms of the proportions of dominant and dominated 
choices made by class A subjects. 
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personality and demographic characteristics are individually and jointly insignificant at the 10% 
level.27 The dummies for game 2p2n and game 3p2n capture any remaining differences with 
respect to game 2p3n. In all estimations, we drop the three class A/C subjects, leaving us with 
109 subjects. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Model 1 reports marginal effects for ordered logit estimation with the reasoning classes as the 
dependent variable: We conservatively re-assign subjects from the borderline classes A/B and 
B/C to classes A and B, respectively. The estimates for the game dummies confirm the overall 
higher likelihood of sounder reasoning processes in games 2p2n and 3p2n compared to game 
2p3n. The remaining estimates suggest that higher working memory, need for cognition, and 
premeditation are associated with a lower likelihood of reasoning inconsistently with dominance 
(class A) and with a higher likelihood of reasoning consistently with dominance (class C).28
Since a Hausman-type specification test for Model 1 suggests that treating reasoning classes B 
and C separately is unnecessary, we merge the classes in Model 2. The resulting logit estimates 
reaffirm the results of Model 1, namely the positive predictive power of measured working 
memory, need for cognition, and premeditation for our subjects’ ability to reason consistently 
with dominance. A one-standard-deviation increase in any of the three variables is associated 
with an increase in the likelihood of using a sound reasoning process (here class B or higher) by 
over 10 percentage points.29
                                                 
27 As an exception, arithmetic ability affects both reasoning classes and choices when included instead of 
or besides working memory, but its impact is generally weaker than that of working memory. We 
measure arithmetic ability using a “two-digit addition and subtraction” test under time pressure (see 
Rydval et al., 2008, for more details). Since we lack arithmetic ability scores for the first experimental 
session, we focus on the effect of working memory in the full sample, noting that working memory is 
correlated with arithmetic ability at the 10% significance level (Spearman correlation of 0.19) and hence 
that part of the explanatory power of working memory may reflect the impact of arithmetic ability. One 
could in principle separate the impact of working memory, arithmetic ability, and short-term memory on 
behavior (see Rydval, 2007), but this seems undesirable here due to the limited sample of subjects with 
arithmetic ability and short-term memory scores (additional ten observations are missing for logistical 
reasons). 
28 In all estimations, the working memory score is the total number of correctly recalled letters only in 
letter sequences recalled entirely correctly. An alternative score, based on the total number of correctly 
recalled letters, has less predictive power in our estimations. See Conway et al. (2005) for a comparison 
of the two valid working memory scoring procedures. 
29 These effects are independent to the extent that working memory, need for cognition, and 
premeditation are not correlated in our subject sample at the 10% significance level. 
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Model 3 reports marginal effects for logit estimation with choices as the dependent variable. The 
negative estimates reflect that higher working memory, need for cognition, and premeditation 
are associated with a higher likelihood of making the dominant choice of 0. However, 
comparing Model 2 and Model 3 reveals that the predictive power and magnitude of impact of 
the three cognitive and personality characteristics is much higher in the former model.30 This in 
our view further confirms the value-added of attending to reasoning processes, besides choices, 
when assessing our subjects’ ability to reason consistently with dominance. 
We note once again the marked across-game differences in reasoning processes and choices 
which prevail even after accounting for the effect of cognitive and personality characteristics.31 
Though not reported in Table 4, there are no differences in the effect of working memory, need 
for cognition, and premeditation across the games. Therefore, dominance seems harder to 
understand or apply in the weak-dominance-solvable game 2p3n (with lower random dominance 
compliance) compared to the strict-dominance-solvable games 2p2n and 3p2n. 
6.3 Further exploring origins of dominance-incompatible reasoning  
Our classification procedure reveals further insights about the nature of reasoning errors. First, 
the examiners indicated that misunderstanding the experiment’s instructions appeared rare: only 
up to three class A subjects seemingly misunderstood that they played an iterated-dominance-
solvable guessing game against everyone else in their session.32 Second, nearly a quarter of class 
A subjects apparently failed to incorporate the target number, ½, in their reasoning process, yet 
this was unlikely due to their misunderstanding of the instructions per se (since we stressed the 
target number when reading the instructions aloud) but rather due to a reasoning or 
computational error. Third, nearly half of class A subjects reported irrelevant belief-based 
reasoning such as “I believe the other player chooses 1, so I will choose 1 and we will split the 
prize,” or irrelevant focal-number reasoning such as “I like number 1 more than number 0 and 
hence choose 1.” These kinds of irrelevant reasoning might likewise stem from failing to 
incorporate the target number, i.e., interpreting it as unity. In the 2p2n and 2p3n games, this 
would imply a game where both players win regardless of their choices. In game 3p2n, this 
                                                 
30 We include need for cognition in Model 3 for the purpose of a direct comparison with Model 2. 
Although the preferred model of choice behavior does not feature need for cognition, including it does 
not affect the significance of the other regressors. 
31 Although need for cognition is on average significantly lower for subjects in game 2p3n than in game 
3p2n at the 5% level (using a two-sided rank-sum test and t-test), Table 4 shows that this cannot explain 
the lower performance of subjects in game 2p3n. 
32 Here and hereafter, we quantify the maximum extent of specific types of reasoning errors, as indicated 
by either of the examiners in the nine-class classification scheme (see Appendix 2). 
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would imply a game where one’s own choice has a pivotal influence on the winning choice only 
if the other two players choose 0 and 1. Thus choosing 0 would no longer be a dominant strategy 
in any of our games. 
This suggests that many class A subjects might have misrepresented the strategic nature of our 
guessing games and hence played a wrong game. Indeed, in Devetag and Warglien’s (2008) 
two-player game similar to our guessing games, nearly a quarter of subjects misrepresented the 
relational structure between own and other’s preferences.33 Strategic misrepresentations could 
be even more widespread in our games since Devetag and Warglien explicitly display the to-be-
represented preferences, whereas we rely on subjects inferring the preference (payoff) structure 
from the verbal instructions. 
To explore the nature and extent of strategic misrepresentations, we conducted four additional 
sessions for the simplest game 2p2n. We changed our experimental design in that subjects first 
filled out all contingencies, i.e., the four combinations of both players’ possible choices and their 
payoff consequences (see Appendix 1). We also asked subjects to rank the contingencies 
according to their preferences, had they been able to choose among them (subjects could express 
indifference between any contingencies by using ranking such as “1, 2, 2, 4” or “1, 3, 3, 3”). 
Only then were subjects prompted to report their complete reasoning leading them to their 
choice and to state their choice and beliefs. The additional sessions otherwise resembled the 
original ones, including the payoff function and the subject population.34
Before answering our key question, we note that out of the 64 additional subjects, 50% reasoned 
in line with dominance (class C) while the rest did not (class A), and 31% of subjects violated 
dominance by making dominated choices. Hence compared to our findings in Tables 2 and 3, 
asking subjects to represent game 2p2n in terms of its contingencies seems to slightly reduce but 
                                                 
33 Devetag and Warglien categorize two-player games by type of bi-ordered preference structures varying 
in relational complexity. Their subjects select four out of 16 possible squares simultaneously representing 
two order relations, one represented by the size and the other by the color of the squares. Our guessing 
games fall into a category of preference bi-orders found in games of conflict where players’ preference 
relations are the reverse of one another (though our games feature non-strict payoff relations unlike 
Devetag and Warglien’s games). Harder relational structures found in chicken games and prisoner’s 
dilemma games were misrepresented by 34% and 52% of Devetag and Warglien’s subjects, respectively 
(138 undergraduate and MBA students in two related experiments). 
34 Subjects’ earnings did not depend on how they filled out and ranked the contingencies, but completing 
these tasks was a precondition for receiving the participation fee. Subjects were undergraduates from the 
University of Economics and Czech University of Life Sciences in Prague. 
 
17
Page 19 of 33
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
certainly not eliminate dominance violations.35 This finding is in the spirit of GNa’s observation 
that implementing more elaborate instructions in their dominance-solvable guessing game does 
little to improve subjects’ understanding of dominance. 
As to our key question, all but one class C subject filled out the four contingencies correctly.36 
By contrast, all but two class A subjects were unable to do so, despite always correctly listing all 
combinations of choices. A third of class A subjects assigned identical payoff, M/2, to both 
players in all contingencies (and their reasoning reveals a failure to incorporate the target 
number, ½); another third assigned the prize, M, to the dominated rather than the dominant 
choice; and the remaining third filled out partly or entirely wrong payoffs – seemingly illogical 
fractions of M or payoffs not summing to M (for a given contingency). 
7. Discussion and conclusion 
To understand the nature of dominance violations in dominance-solvable guessing games, we 
study the relationship among subjects’ reasoning processes, choices, beliefs, and cognitive and 
personality characteristics. Our classification of reasoning processes suggests that only 27-36% 
of subjects reason in line with dominance; they all make the dominant choice and almost all 
expect others to do so. On the other hand, 59-64% of subjects reason inconsistently with 
dominance, of which about three-quarters make dominated choices (and almost all of those 
expect others to do so) but the remaining quarter perhaps accidentally make the dominant choice 
(and half of those expect others to do so). 
Our additional findings in Section 6.3 reveal that dominance-incompatible reasoning stems 
primarily from subjects misrepresenting the strategic nature of the games. Specifically, half of 
our additional subjects, and likely a similar fraction of our original subjects, were unable to 
connect their own and others’ choices with the payoff consequences, despite the minimalist 
nature of our games and despite having virtually unlimited time for clarification questions and 
for making decisions. This kind of bounded rationality, observed in a similar form by Devetag 
                                                 
35 These observations rest on classification done by the authors. Similar to our findings in Tables 2 and 3, 
our additional class C subjects all make the dominant choice and almost all believe that others would do 
so; most of the additional class A subjects make dominated choices and expect others to do so, yet nearly 
a third of class A subjects make the dominant choice and nearly half of those expect others to do so. 
36 Interestingly, a quarter of class C subjects indicated in their ranking (and sometimes also in their 
reasoning) a preference for splitting the prize with the other player – by ranking highest the contingencies 
with choice pairs (0, 0) and (1, 1) – or an indifference between winning and splitting the prize. The 
remaining class C subjects ranked the four contingencies according to their own payoff. 
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and Warglien (2008), underlies the game-theoretic notion of “sampling equilibria” (e.g., 
Osborne and Rubinstein, 1998). We note, however, that this kind of bounded rationality may 
conceivably be less widespread in more naturalistic settings than ours. 
In our original subject sample, the likelihood of reasoning errors – most likely misrepresentation 
errors – is higher for subjects’ with lower ability to maintain and allocate attention, as measured 
by working memory. This is in line with Devetag and Warglien’s (2008) finding of a positive 
link between short-term memory and the ability to represent preference structures similar to our 
guessing games – though short-term and working memory are quite distinct cognitive constructs 
(see Section 4) – and also in line with Burnham et al.’s (2009) finding of a positive link between 
a short test of general cognitive ability and performance in an iterated-dominance-solvable 
guessing game.37 We acknowledge that the observed impact of working memory may partly 
reflect the influence of arithmetic ability (see footnote 27). Also, the effect of working memory 
might be a combination of a direct effect on behavior and an indirect one activated by requiring 
subjects to report their reasoning processes.38
In our original subject sample, reasoning (misrepresentation) errors are also more likely for 
subjects with ex ante lower intrinsic motivation and premeditation attitude, presumably due to 
their lower willingness to engage in solving the guessing games or to carefully think through the 
solution. In our view, this does not contradict CGC’s conclusion that deviations from theoretical 
predictions in their iterated-dominance-solvable guessing games are mainly driven by cognitive 
errors rather than insufficient motivation. Our findings suggest that insufficiently (intrinsically) 
motivated subjects were most likely excluded from CGC’s subject sample after failing an 
understanding test.39
Put differently, our findings suggest that had we implemented the listing of contingencies as an 
understanding test and dismissed subjects failing it – which would have been mostly those with 
low working memory, intrinsic motivation or premeditation attitude – we would have observed a 
                                                 
37 Neither of the two studies account for other potential sources of individual heterogeneity in cognitive 
abilities and personality traits (as Devetag and Warglien acknowledge), though Burnham et al. control for 
individual differences in gender, education, and age. 
38 Cognitive scientists, especially proponents of Protocol Analysis, usually take more care than we did to 
train subjects in verbalizing thought processes in a manner not interfering with solving the task itself 
(e.g., Ericsson and Simon, 1993; Ericsson, 2002). Describing thought processes – especially aloud, i.e., 
not in our case – may require additional cognitive resources, divert task-specific cognitive processes and 
hence generate invalid descriptions of thoughts, particularly in insight tasks requiring creative thinking 
(e.g., Schooler et al., 1993). 
39 CGC dismiss about 20% of subjects based on failing a detailed understanding test. 
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much lower rate of dominance violation. From this perspective, our findings do not contradict 
the much lower dominance violation rates observed in Bone et al.’s (2009) extensive-form 
dominance-solvable game (where presenting the payoff structure visually presumably makes 
dominance transparent) or in iterated-dominance-solvable games (where subjects usually have to 
pass a “payoff structure understanding” test). A similar qualification probably also applies to the 
dauntingly high dominance violation rate reported in GN’s dominance-solvable guessing game. 
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APPENDIX 1: Instructions and answer protocol 
[The instructions below were presented to subjects for game 2p2n. Italics denote alterations for 
games 2p3n and 3p2n. The instructions were in Czech and were preceded by general instructions 
explaining, among other things, the anonymity of the experiment and the privacy of the paying-
out procedure. Explanatory notes in square brackets do not appear in the instructions. The bold 
face appears in the instructions.] 
 
BONUS TASK! BONUS TASK! BONUS TASK! BONUS TASK! 
 
ID: ________________ 
 
In this task, you will be randomly matched with one (two) other participant(s) in this room who 
will be solving the same task as you will. The task will be explained below. 
 
From now on, the two (three) of you will be called a ‘group’. 
 
After everyone has finished the task, the winner from one randomly selected group will earn a 
prize of 1,500 CZK. If the group has more than one winner, the prize of 1,500 CZK will be split 
evenly between the winners. 
 
The task: 
 
Each member of the group chooses a number: 0 or 1 (0, 1 or 2). 
 
The winner is the group member whose choice is closest to ½ of the average of the numbers 
chosen by all group members. [The experimenter read the instructions aloud, stressing the “½” 
to ensure the target number was not overlooke .] 
 
[In the additional sessions (see Section 6.3), we inserted here instructions asking subjects to fill 
out the four combinations of both players’ possible choices and their payoff consequences, in 
four consecutive tables of the following format: 
 
Your choice:   Your payoff:   
His/her choice:   His/her payoff:   
 
Then subjects were asked to rank the tables (i.e., the combinations of choices and resulting 
payoffs) according to their preferences, had they been able to choose among them.] 
 
Below, please write down the complete reasoning leading you to your choice and then 
answer the questions at the bottom of the page. Write while you think! (If you need more 
space, please turn over and continue.) 
 
[Here subjects were given much more space to report their reasoning.] 
 
Your choice: 
Number (please circle) 0 1 (2) 
 
Question: What choice do you expect from the other member(s) of your group? 
Number (please circle) 0 1 (2) 
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APPENDIX 2: Details of the classification procedure 
In the classification instructions, we first presented the examiners with the three guessing games 
through a condensed version of the experiment’s instructions accompanied by Figure 1. We 
reminded the examiners that they may encounter different reasoning processes across the three 
guessing games but that it is important to classify them consistently across the games. 
The classification instructions further stressed that “[i]t is extremely important for us that you 
are consistent in your classification, from the very first to the very last subject. It may well 
happen during the classification that you change your mind about how you classified a previous 
subject. This is not an error on your part but please do tell us about such cases before proceeding 
with further classification.” The examiners were encouraged to independently contact the second 
author in case of any questions or ambiguities, preferably before starting (or restarting) their 
classification. 
To minimize the potential scope for subjective classification errors, we initially asked the 
examiners to independently classify subjects’ reasoning processes according to a more detailed 
nine-class classification scheme. Being based on our evaluation of reasoning processes in 
previous pilot experiments, the nine narrower reasoning classes corresponded to the various 
subtle distinctions among potentially reported reasoning processes (see the above discussion in 
Section 3).  
After the nine-class classification scheme, we were able to clarify those distinctions to the 
examiners (through examples unrelated to their specific nine-class classification results), to 
explain them how to classify reasoning processes within the three-class classification scheme 
and what types of classification errors to attend to. Judging from the examiners’ feedback and 
their classification adjustments between the two classification schemes, we were successful in 
tackling these issues. Being based on classifying reasoning processes using pre-specified, 
narrowly-defined nine classes of potentially reported reasoning processes, our classification 
procedure meets the standards of the Protocol Analysis (see, e.g., Ericsson, 2002). 
The three-class classification scheme yielded about 20% of classification disagreements between 
the examiners, half of which they subsequently jointly resolved (only if they deemed 
appropriate). This final re-classification procedure therefore left us with 10% (11 out of 112) of 
classification disagreements, which the examiners jointly assigned into the borderline classes in 
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accordance with the nature of their disagreement. In similar fashion, the examiners also jointly 
re-examined the remaining subjects in the borderline classes and re-classified them if they 
deemed appropriate. For all the above cases, we revealed to the examiners the subjects’ stated 
choices and beliefs to which they were a priori blind. 
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CAPTIONS FOR FIGURES AND TABLES 
Figure 1: The guessing games in normal-form representation 
 
 
 
Table 1: Order of experimental sessions and number of participants 
 
 
 
Table 2: Frequency of subjects sorted by reasoning classes, choices and beliefs 
 
 
 
Table 3: Percentages (rounded to integers) of reasoning classes and choices for each game 
 
 
 
Table 4: Logistic regressions of reasoning classes (Model 1 and Model 2) and choices 
(Model 3) on cognitive and personality characteristics 
 
Notes: Marginal effects are evaluated at the means of the regressors. Marginal effects in the 
ordered logit Model 1 are for classes A, B and C. Working memory, need for cognition, and 
premeditation are z-standardized using their sample means and sample standard deviations. 
Standard errors and tests are based on the heteroskedasticity-robust “sandwich” estimator. *, ** 
and *** indicate significance of estimates at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. “Joint 
significance” stands for a chi-square test of joint significance of working memory, need for 
cognition, and premeditation. “LR” stands for an approximate likelihood ratio test of the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients are equal across classes. “Hausman” stands for a Hausman-type 
specification test of the null hypothesis that classes B and C can be merged. 
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Game 2p2n: 2 players, 2 numbers 
 
  Player 2 
 0 1 
0 M/2,M/2 M,0 
Pl
ay
er
 1
 
1 0,M M/2,M/2 
 
 
Game 2p3n: 2 players, 3 numbers 
 
  Player 2 
 0 1 2 
0 M/2,M/2 M,0 M,0 
1 0,M M/2,M/2 M,0 
   
Pl
ay
er
 1
 
2 0,M 0,M M/2,M/2 
 
 
Game 3p2n: 3 players, 2 numbers 
 
Player 3’s choice = 0            Player 3’s choice = 1  
 
  Player 2   Player 2 
 0 1  0 1 
0 M/3,M/3,M/3 M/2,0,M/2 0 M/2,M/2,0 M,0,0 
Pl
ay
er
 1
 
1 0,M/2,M/2 0,0,M P
la
ye
r 1
 
1 0,M,0 M/3,M/3,M/3
 
 
Figure(s)
Page 30 of 33
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 
Session 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Game 3p2n 2p2n 2p3n 3p2n 2p2n 2p3n 2p3n 3p2n 
# participants 15 14 14 12 14 14 13 16 
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Total Class A Class A/B Class A/C Class B Class B/C Class C
All subjects 112 66 3 3 3 7 30
Choice=0 62 17 2 3 3 7 30
Choice=1 50 49 1 0 0 0 0
Belief=0 49 12 1 2 3 4 27
Belief=1 63 54 2 1 0 3 3
Choice=0 & Belief=0 46 9 1 2 3 4 27
Choice=0 & Belief=1 16 8 1 1 0 3 3
Choice=1 & Belief=0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0
Choice=1 & Belief=1 47 46 1 0 0 0 0
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Total Class A Class A/B Class A/C Class B Class B/C Class C
Game 2p2n (28 subj.) 100 57 4 0 4 11 25
Choice=0 57 14 4 0 4 11 25
Choice=1 43 43 0 0 0 0 0
Game 2p3n (41 subj.) 100 76 2 5 2 2 12
Choice=0 39 17 0 5 2 2 12
Choice=1 61 59 2 0 0 0 0
Game 3p2n (43 subj.) 100 44 2 2 2 7 42
Choice=0 70 14 2 2 2 7 42
Choice=1 30 30 0 0 0 0 0
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
marg. eff. marg. eff. marg. eff. marg. eff. marg. eff.
(std. err.) (std. err.) (std. err.) (std. err.) (std. err.)
-0.303** 0.043* 0.261** 0.334** -0.241**
(0.133) (0.022) (0.123) (0.136) (0.119)
-0.346*** 0.055** 0.291*** 0.354*** -0.320***
(0.114) (0.026) (0.104) (0.120) (0.108)
-0.084* 0.018 0.066* 0.106** -0.089*
(0.049) (0.013) (0.038) (0.054) (0.052)
-0.108** 0.023 0.085** 0.115** -0.044
(0.051) (0.015) (0.039) (0.054) (0.054)
-0.118** 0.025** 0.093** 0.129** -0.010*
(0.046) (0.012) (0.038) (0.056) (0.056)
*** ***
Number of subjects 69 10 30 109 109
74.31 64.22
% correctly predicted
premeditation
Joint significance
working memory
need for cognition
game 3p2n
REGRESSOR
game 2p2n
Hausman chi-square(5)=2.07, p=0.840
LR chi-square(5)=5.37, p=0.372
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